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ABSTRACT
Differential privacy mechanism design has traditionally been tai-
lored for a scalar-valued query function. Although many mecha-
nisms such as the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms can be ex-
tended to a matrix-valued query function by adding i.i.d. noise to
each element of the matrix, this method is often suboptimal as it
forfeits an opportunity to exploit the structural characteristics typi-
cally associated with matrix analysis. To address this challenge, we
propose a novel differential privacy mechanism called the Matrix-
Variate Gaussian (MVG) mechanism, which adds a matrix-valued
noise drawn from amatrix-variate Gaussian distribution, andwe rig-
orously prove that the MVGmechanism preserves (ϵ,δ )-differential
privacy. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of directional noise
made possible by the design of the MVG mechanism. Directional
noise allows the impact of the noise on the utility of the matrix-
valued query function to be moderated. Finally, we experimen-
tally demonstrate the performance of our mechanism using three
matrix-valued queries on three privacy-sensitive datasets. We find
that the MVG mechanism can notably outperforms four previous
state-of-the-art approaches, and provides comparable utility to the
non-private baseline.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [23, 24] has become the gold standard for a
rigorous privacy guarantee. This has prompted the development
of many mechanisms including the classical Laplace mechanism
[24] and the Exponential mechanism [67]. In addition, there are
other mechanisms that build upon these two classical ones such
as those based on data partition and aggregation [2, 15, 44, 57,
76, 80, 81, 94, 95, 97, 101], and those based on adaptive queries
[26, 37, 41, 58, 59, 64, 99]. From this observation, differentially-
private mechanisms may be categorized into the basic and derived
mechanisms. Privacy guarantee of the basic mechanisms is self-
contained, whereas that of the derived mechanisms is achieved
through a combination of basic mechanisms, composition theorems,
and the post-processing invariance property [22].
In this work, we design a basic mechanism for matrix-valued
queries. Existing basic mechanisms for differential privacy are de-
signed typically for scalar-valued query functions. However, in
many practical settings, the query functions are multi-dimensional
and can be succinctly represented asmatrix-valued functions. Exam-
ples of matrix-valued query functions in the real-world applications
include the covariance matrix [8, 13, 27], the kernel matrix [55],
the adjacency matrix [34], the incidence matrix [34], the rotation
matrix [47], the Hessian matrix [85], the transition matrix [33], and
the density matrix [91], which find applications in statistics [32],
machine learning [88], graph theory [34], differential equations
[85], computer graphics [47], probability theory [33], quantum
mechanics [91], and many other fields [92].
One property that distinguishes the matrix-valued query func-
tions from the scalar-valued query functions is the relationship
and interconnection among the elements of the matrix. One may
naively treat these matrices as merely a collection of scalar values,
but that could prove suboptimal since the structure and relation-
ship among these scalar values are often informative and essential
to the understanding and analysis of the system. For example, in
graph theory, the adjacency matrix is symmetric for an undirected
graph, but not for a directed graph [34] – an observation which
is implausible to extract from simply looking at the collection of
elements without considering how they are arranged in the matrix.
In differential privacy, the standard method for a matrix-valued
query function is to extend a scalar-valued mechanism by adding
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise to each element
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Figure 1: Given a matrix-valued query function f (X) ∈
Rm×n , the MVG mechanism adds a matrix-valued noise
drawn from the matrix-variate Gaussian distribution
MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) to guarantee (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
The schematic shows an example whenm = n = 2.
of the matrix [23–25]. However, this method may not be optimal
as it fails to utilize the structural characteristics of the matrix-
valued noise and query function. Although some advanced methods
have explored this possibility in an iterative/procedural manner
[37, 41, 75], the structural characteristics of the matrices are still
largely under-investigated. This is partly due to the lack of a basic
mechanism that is directly designed for matrix-valued query func-
tions, making such utilization and application of available tools in
matrix analysis challenging.
In this work, we formalize the study of the matrix-valued differ-
ential privacy, and present a new basic mechanism that can readily
exploit the structural characteristics of the matrices – the Matrix-
Variate Gaussian (MVG) mechanism. The high-level concept of the
MVGmechanism is simple – it adds a matrix-variate Gaussian noise
scaled to the L2-sensitivity of the matrix-valued query function (cf.
Fig. 1). We rigorously prove that the MVG mechanism guarantees
(ϵ,δ )-differential privacy. Moreover, due to the multi-dimensional
nature of the noise and the query function, the MVG mechanism
allows flexibility in the design via the novel notion of directional
noise. An important consequence of the concept of directional noise
is that the matrix-valued noise in the MVG mechanism can be de-
vised to affect certain parts of the matrix-valued query function
less than the others, while providing the same privacy guarantee.
In practice, this property could be beneficial as the noise can be
tailored to minimally impact the intended utility.
Finally, to illustrate the effectiveness of the MVG mechanism, we
conduct experiments on three privacy-sensitive real-world datasets
– Liver Disorders [30, 61],Movement Prediction [4], and Cardiotocog-
raphy [18, 61]. The experiments include three tasks involvingmatrix-
valued query functions – regression, finding the first principal com-
ponent, and covariance estimation. The results show that the MVG
mechanism can outperform four prior state-of-the-art mechanisms
– the Laplace mechanism, the Gaussianmechanism, the Exponential
mechanism, and the JL transform – in utility in all experiments.
To summarize, our main contributions are as follows.
• We formalize the study of matrix-valued query functions in
differential privacy and introduce the novel Matrix-Variate
Gaussian (MVG) mechanism.
• We rigorously prove that the MVG mechanism guarantees
(ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
• We introduce a novel concept of directional noise, and pro-
pose two simple algorithms to implement this novel concept
with the MVG mechanism.
• We evaluate our approach on three real-world datasets and
show that our approach can outperform four prior mech-
anisms in all experiments, and yields utility close to the
non-private baseline.
2 PRIORWORKS
Existing mechanisms for differential privacy may be categorized
into two types: the basic mechanism [7, 10, 23–25, 62, 67, 86, 87];
and the derived mechanism [2, 12, 15, 17, 26, 37, 41, 41, 43, 44, 49,
50, 54, 57–60, 64, 76, 79–81, 94–97, 101]. Since our work concerns
the basic mechanism design, we focus our discussion on this type,
and provide a general overview of the other.
2.1 Basic Mechanisms
Basicmechanisms are thosewhose privacy guarantee is self-contained,
i.e. it does not deduce the guarantee from another mechanism. Here,
we discuss four popular existing basic mechanisms.
2.1.1 Laplace Mechanism. The classical Laplace mechanism [24]
adds noise drawn from the Laplace distribution scaled to the L1-
sensitivity of the query function. It was initially designed for a
scalar-valued query function, but can be extended to a matrix-
valued query function by adding i.i.d. Laplace noise to each ele-
ment of the matrix. The Laplace mechanism provides the strong
ϵ-differential privacy guarantee and is relatively simple to imple-
ment. However, its generalization to a matrix-valued query function
does not automatically utilize the structure of the matrices involved.
2.1.2 Gaussian Mechanism. The Gaussian mechanism [23, 25, 62]
uses i.i.d. additive noise drawn from theGaussian distribution scaled
to the L2-sensitivity. The Gaussian mechanism guarantees (ϵ,δ )-
differential privacy. Like the Laplace mechanism, it also does not
automatically consider the structure of the matrices.
2.1.3 Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) Transform. The JL transformmethod
[7] uses multiplicative noise to guarantee (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
It is, in fact, a rare basic mechanism designed for a matrix-valued
query function. Despite its promise, previous works show that
the JL transform method can be applied to queries with certain
properties only, e.g.
• Blocki et al. [7] use a random matrix, whose elements are
drawn i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution, and the method
is applicable to the Laplacian of a graph and the covariance
matrix;
• Blum and Roth [10] use a hash function that implicitly rep-
resents the JL transform, and the method is suitable for a
sparse query;
• Upadhyay [86, 87] uses a multiplicative combination of ran-
dom matrices to provide a JL transform that is applicable to
any matrix-valued query function whose singular values are
all above a threshold.
Among these methods, Upadhyay’s works [86, 87] stand out as
possibly the most general. In our experiments, we show that our
approach can yield higher utility for the same privacy budget than
these methods.
2.1.4 Exponential Mechanism. The Exponential mechanism uses
noise introduced via the sampling process [67]. It draws its query an-
swers from a custom distribution designed to preserve ϵ-differential
privacy. To provide reasonable utility, the distribution is chosen
based on the quality function, which indicates the utility score of
each possible sample. Due to its generality, it has been utilized for
many types of query functions, including the matrix-valued query
functions. We experimentally compare our approach to the Expo-
nential mechanism, and show that, with slightly weaker privacy
guarantee, our method can yield significant utility improvement.
Summary. Finally, we conclude that our method differs from
the four existing basic mechanisms as follows. In contrast with
the i.i.d. noise in the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms, the MVG
mechanism allows a non-i.i.d. noise (cf. Sec. 5). As opposed to the
multiplicative noise in the JL transform and the sampling noise in
the Exponential mechanism, the MVG mechanism uses an additive
noise for matrix-valued query functions.
2.2 Derived Mechanisms
Derived mechanisms – also referred to as “revised algorithms” by
Blocki et al. [7] – are those whose privacy guarantee is deduced
from other basic mechanisms via the composition theorems and
the post-processing invariance property [22]. Derived mechanisms
are often designed to provide better utility by exploiting some
properties of the query function or the data.
The general techniques used by derived mechanisms are often
translatable among basic mechanisms, including our MVG mecha-
nism. Given our focus on a novel basic mechanism, these techniques
are less relevant to our work, and we leave the investigation of in-
tegrating them into the MVG framework in the future work, and
some of the popular techniques used by derived mechanisms are
summarized here.
2.2.1 Sensitivity Control. This technique avoids the worst-case
sensitivity in basic mechanisms by using variant concepts of sen-
sitivity. Examples include the smooth sensitivity [76] and elastic
sensitivity [50].
2.2.2 Data Partition and Aggregation. This technique uses data
partition and aggregation to produce more accurate query answers
[2, 15, 44, 57, 80, 81, 94, 95, 97, 101]. The partition and aggregation
processes are done in a differentially-private manner either via the
composition theorems and the post-processing invariance prop-
erty [22], or with a small extra privacy cost. Hay et al. [43] nicely
summarize many works that utilize this concept.
2.2.3 Non-uniformDataWeighting. This technique lowers the level
of perturbation required for the privacy protection by weighting
each data sample or dataset differently [17, 37, 41, 79]. The rationale
is that each sample in a dataset, or each instance of the dataset itself,
has a heterogeneous contribution to the query output. Therefore,
these mechanisms place a higher weight on the critical samples or
instances of the database to provide better utility.
2.2.4 Data Compression. This approach reduces the level of pertur-
bation required for differential privacy via dimensionality reduction.
Various dimensionality reduction methods have been proposed. For
example, Kenthapadi et al. [54], Xu et al. [96], Li et al. [60] and
Chanyaswad et al. [12] use random projection; Jiang et al. [49]
use principal component analysis (PCA) and linear discriminant
analysis (LDA); Xiao et al. [94] use wavelet transform; and Acs et
al. [2] use lossy Fourier transform.
2.2.5 Adaptive Queries. These methods use past/auxiliary infor-
mation to improve the utility of the query answers. Examples are
the matrix mechanism [58, 59], the multiplicative weights mecha-
nism [37, 41], the low-rank mechanism [99, 100], correlated noise
[75, 93], least-square estimation [75], boosting [26], and the sparse
vector technique [25, 64]. We also note that some of these adaptive
methods can be used in the restricted case of matrix-valued query
where the matrix-valued query can be decomposed into multiple
linear vector-valued queries [41, 42, 74, 75, 98, 100]. However, such
as an approach does not generalize for arbitrary matrix-valued
queries.
Summary. We conclude with the following three main observa-
tions. (a) First, the MVG mechanism falls into the category of basic
mechanism. (b) Second, techniques used in derived mechanisms are
generally applicable to multiple basic mechanisms, including our
novel MVG mechanism. (c) Finally, therefore, for fair comparison,
we will compare the MVGmechanism with the four state-of-the-art
basic mechanisms presented in this section.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Matrix-Valued Query
We use the term dataset interchangeably with database, and rep-
resent it with the data matrix X ∈ RM×N , whose columns are the
M-dimensional vector samples/records. The matrix-valued query
function, f (X) ∈ Rm×n , hasm rows and n columns 1. We define
the notion of neighboring datasets {X1,X2} as two datasets that
differ by a single record, and denote it as d(X1,X2) = 1. We note,
however, that although the neighboring datasets differ by only a
single record, f (X1) and f (X2) may differ in every element.
We denote a matrix-valued random variable with the calligraphic
font, e.g.Z, and its instance with the bold font, e.g. Z. Finally, as
will become relevant later, we use the columns of X to denote the
samples in the dataset.
3.2 (ϵ,δ )-Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [21, 23] guarantees that the involvement of any
one particular record of the dataset would not drastically change
the query answer.
Definition 1. A mechanism A on a query function f (·) is (ϵ,δ )-
differentially-private if for all neighboring datasets {X1,X2}, and
for all possible measurable matrix-valued outputs S ⊆ Rm×n ,
Pr[A(f (X1)) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ Pr[A(f (X2)) ∈ S] + δ .
1Note that we use the capital M, N for the dimension of the dataset, but the small
m, n for the dimension of the query output.
3.3 Matrix-Variate Gaussian Distribution
One of our main innovations is the use of the noise drawn from
a matrix-variate probability distribution. Specifically, in the MVG
mechanism, the additive noise is drawn from the matrix-variate
Gaussian distribution, defined as follows [16, 20, 36, 48, 73, 90].
Definition 2. Anm × n matrix-valued random variable X has a
matrix-variate Gaussian distributionMVGm,n (M, Σ,Ψ), if it has
the density function:
pX(X) =
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(X −M)T Σ−1(X −M)]}
(2π )mn/2 |Ψ|m/2 |Σ|n/2
,
where tr(·) is the matrix trace [46], |·| is the matrix determinant [46],
M ∈ Rm×n is the mean, Σ ∈ Rm×m is the row-wise covariance, and
Ψ ∈ Rn×n is the column-wise covariance.
Notably, the density function ofMVGm,n (M, Σ,Ψ) looks sim-
ilar to that of the multivariate Gaussian, Nm (µ, Σ). Indeed, the
matrix-variate Gaussian distributionMVGm,n (M, Σ,Ψ) is a gen-
eralization of Nm (µ, Σ) to a matrix-valued random variable. This
leads to a few notable additions. First, the mean vector µ now be-
comes the mean matrix M. Second, in addition to the traditional
row-wise covariance matrix Σ, there is also the column-wise co-
variance matrix Ψ. The latter is due to the fact that, not only could
the rows of the matrix be distributed non-uniformly, but also could
its columns.
We may intuitively explain this addition as follows. If we draw
n i.i.d. samples from Nm (0, Σ) denoted as y1, . . . , yn ∈ Rm , and
concatenate them into a matrix Y = [y1, . . . , yn ] ∈ Rm×n , then, it
can be shown that Y is drawn fromMVGm,n (0, Σ, I), where I is
the identity matrix [16]. However, if we consider the case when the
columns of Y are not i.i.d., and are distributed with the covariance
Ψ instead, then, it can be shown that this is distributed according
toMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) [16].
3.4 Relevant Matrix Algebra Theorems
We recite two major theorems in linear algebra that are essential
to the subsequent analysis. The first one is used in multiple parts
of the analysis including the privacy proof and the interpretation
of the results, while the second one is the concentration bound
essential to the privacy proof.
Theorem 1 (Singular value decomposition (SVD) [46]). A
matrix A ∈ Rm×n can be decomposed as A = W1ΛWT2 , where
W1 ∈ Rm×m ,W2 ∈ Rn×n are unitary, and Λ is a diagonal matrix
whose diagonal elements are the ordered singular values ofA, denoted
as σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ · · · ≥ 0.
Theorem 2 (Laurent-Massart [56]). For a matrix-variate ran-
dom variable N ∼ MVGm,n (0, Im , In ), δ ∈ [0, 1], and ζ (δ ) =
2
√−mn lnδ − 2 lnδ +mn,
Pr[∥N ∥2F ≤ ζ (δ )2] ≥ 1 − δ .
4 MVG MECHANISM: DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACYWITH MATRIX-VALUED QUERY
Matrix-valued query functions are different from their scalar coun-
terparts in terms of the vital information contained in how the
X ∈ RM×N database/dataset whose N columns are data
samples andM rows are attributes/features.
MVGm,n (0, Σ, Ψ) m × n matrix-variate Gaussian distribution
with zero mean, the row-wise covariance Σ,
and the column-wise covariance Ψ.
f (X) ∈ Rm×n matrix-valued query function
r min{m,n}
Hr generalized harmonic numbers of order r
Hr,1/2 generalized harmonic numbers of order r of
1/2
γ supX ∥ f (X)∥F
ζ (δ ) 2√−mn lnδ − 2 lnδ +mn
σ (Σ−1) vector of non-increasing singular values of Σ−1
σ (Ψ−1) vector of non-increasing singular values of Ψ−1
Table 1: Notations for the differential privacy analysis.
elements are arranged in the matrix. To fully exploit these struc-
tural characteristics of matrix-valued query functions, we present
our novel mechanism formatrix-valued query functions: theMatrix-
Variate Gaussian (MVG) mechanism.
First, let us introduce the sensitivity of the matrix-valued query
function used in the MVG mechanism.
Definition 3 (Sensitivity). Given a matrix-valued query function
f (X) ∈ Rm×n , define the L2-sensitivity as,
s2(f ) = sup
d (X1,X2)=1
∥ f (X1) − f (X2)∥F ,
where ∥·∥F is the Frobenius norm [46].
Then, we present the MVG mechanism as follows.
Definition 4 (MVG mechanism). Given a matrix-valued query
function f (X) ∈ Rm×n , and a matrix-valued random variableZ ∼
MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ), the MVG mechanism is defined as,
MVG(f (X)) = f (X) +Z,
where Σ is the row-wise covariance matrix, and Ψ is the column-
wise covariance matrix.
So far, we have not specified how to pick Σ and Ψ according to
the sensitivity s2(f ) in the MVGmechanism. We discuss the explicit
form of Σ and Ψ next.
As the additive matrix-valued noise of the MVG mechanism
is drawn fromMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ), the parameters to be designed
for the MVG mechanism are the two covariance matrices Σ and
Ψ. The following theorem presents a sufficient condition for the
values of Σ and Ψ to ensure that the MVG mechanism preserves
(ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
Theorem 3. Let
σ (Σ−1) = [σ1(Σ−1), . . . ,σm (Σ−1)]T ,
and
σ (Ψ−1) = [σ1(Ψ−1), . . . ,σn (Ψ−1)]T
be the vectors of non-increasingly ordered singular values of Σ−1 and
Ψ−1, respectively, and let the relevant variables be defined according
to Table 1. Then, the MVG mechanism guarantees (ϵ,δ )-differential
privacy if Σ and Ψ satisfy the following condition,2σ (Σ−1)2 σ (Ψ−1)2 ≤ (−β + √β2 + 8αϵ)24α2 , (1)
whereα = [Hr+Hr,1/2]γ 2+2Hrγs2(f ), and β = 2(mn)1/4Hr s2(f )ζ (δ ).
Proof. (Sketch) We only provide the sketch proof here. The full
proof can be found in Appendix A.
The MVG mechanism guarantees (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy if for
every pair of neighboring datasets {X1,X2} and all measurable sets
S ⊆ Rm×n ,
Pr [f (X1) +Z ∈ S] ≤ exp(ϵ) Pr [f (X2) +Z ∈ S] + δ .
Using Definition 2, this is satisfied if we have,∫
S
e−
1
2 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X1))T Σ−1(Y−f (X1))]dY ≤
eϵ
∫
S
e−
1
2 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X2))T Σ−1(Y−f (X2))]dY + δ .
By inserting exp{−
1
2 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X2))T Σ−1(Y−f (X2))]}
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X2))T Σ−1(Y−f (X2))]}
inside the inte-
gral on the left side, it is sufficient to show that
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(Y − f (X1))T Σ−1(Y − f (X1))]}
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(Y − f (X2))T Σ−1(Y − f (X2))]}
≤ exp(ϵ),
with probability ≥ 1−δ . By algebraic manipulations, we can express
this condition as,
tr[Ψ−1YT Σ−1∆ + Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y
+Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2) − Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)] ≤ 2ϵ .
where ∆ = f (X1) − f (X2). This is the necessary condition that has
to be satisfied for all neighboring {X1,X2} with probability ≥ 1−δ
for the MVG mechanism to guarantee (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
Therefore, we refer to it as the characteristic equation. From here,
the proof analyzes the four terms in the sum separately since the
trace is additive. The analysis relies on the following lemmas in
linear algebra.
Lemma 1 (Merikoski-Sarria-Tarazaga [68]). The non-increasingly
ordered singular values of a matrix A ∈ Rm×n have the values of
0 ≤ σi ≤ ∥A∥F /
√
i .
Lemma 2 (von Neumann [89]). Let A,B ∈ Rm×n ; σi (A) and
σi (B) be the non-increasingly ordered singular values of A and B,
respectively; and r = min{m,n}. Then, tr(ABT ) ≤ Σri=1σi (A)σi (B).
Lemma 3 (Trace magnitude bound [45]). Let σi (A) be the
non-increasingly ordered singular values of A ∈ Rm×n , and r =
min{m,n}. Then, |tr(A)| ≤ ∑ri=1 σi (A).
The proof, then, proceeds with the analysis of each term in the
characteristic equation as follows.
The first term: tr[Ψ−1YT Σ−1∆]. Let us denote Y = f (X) +
Z, where f (X) and Z are any possible instances of the query
and the noise, respectively. Then, we can rewrite the first term
as, tr[Ψ−1 f (X)T Σ−1∆] + tr[Ψ−1ZT Σ−1∆]. Both parts are then
bounded by their singular values via Lemma 2. The singular values
2Note that the dependence on δ is via ζ (δ ) in β .
Figure 2: A conceptual display of theMVG design space. The
illustration visualizes the design space coordinated by the
two design parameters of MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ). Each point on
the space corresponds to an instance of MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ).
From this perspective, Theorem 3 suggests that any instance
of MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) in the (conceptual) shaded area would
preserve (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
are, in turn, bounded via Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 with probability
≥ 1 − δ . This gives the bound for the first term:
tr[Ψ−1YT Σ−1∆] ≤ γHr s2(f )ϕ2 + (mn)1/4ζ (δ )Hr s2(f )ϕ,
where ϕ = (σ (Σ−1)2 σ (Ψ−1)2)1/2.
The second term: tr[Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y]. By following the same steps
as in the first term, the second term has the exact same bound as
the first term, i.e.
tr[Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y] ≤ γHr s2(f )ϕ2 + (mn)1/4ζ (δ )Hr s2(f )ϕ .
The third term: tr[Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2)]. Applying Lemma 2 and
Lemma 1, we can readily bound it as,
tr[Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2)] ≤ γ 2Hrϕ2.
The fourth term: −tr[Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)]. Since this term has
the negative sign, we use Lemma 3 to bound its magnitude by its
singular values. Then, we use Lemma 1 to bound the singular values.
This gives the bound for the forth term as,tr[Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)] ≤ γ 2Hr,1/2ϕ2.
Four terms combined: by combining the four terms and rear-
ranging them, the characteristic equation becomes αϕ2 + βϕ ≤
2ϵ . This is a quadratic equation, of which the solution is ϕ ∈
[−β−
√
β 2+8αϵ
2α ,
−β+√β 2+8αϵ
2α ]. Since we know ϕ > 0, we have the
solution,
ϕ ≤ −β +
√
β2 + 8αϵ
2α ,
which implies the criterion in Theorem 3. □
Remark 1. In Theorem 3, we assume that the Frobenius norm of
the query function is bounded for all possible datasets by γ . This
assumption is valid in practice because real-world data are rarely
unbounded (cf. [63]), and it is a common assumption in the analysis
of differential privacy for multi-dimensional query functions (cf.
[13, 24, 27, 102]).
Figure 3: (Left) An ellipsoid of equi-density contour of a 2D
multivariate Gaussian distribution. The two arrows indicate
the principal axes of this ellipsoid. (Right) Directional noise
(red) and i.i.d. noise (blue) drawn from a 2D-multivariate
Gaussian distribution. The green line represents a possible
utility subspace that can benefit from this instance of direc-
tional noise.
Remark 2. The values of the generalized harmonic numbers – Hr ,
and Hr,1/2 – can be obtained from the table lookup for a given
value of r , or can easily be computed recursively [84].
The sufficient condition in Theorem 3 yields an important ob-
servation: the privacy guarantee of the MVG mechanism depends
only on the singular values of Σ and Ψ. In other words, we may
have multiple instances ofMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) that yield the exact
same privacy guarantee (cf. Fig. 2). To better understand this phe-
nomenon, in the next section, we introduce the novel concept of
directional noise.
5 DIRECTIONAL NOISE
Recall from Theorem 3 that the (ϵ,δ )-differential-privacy condition
for the MVG mechanism only applies to the singular values of
the two covariance matrices Σ and Ψ. Here, we investigate the
ramification of this result via the novel notion of directional noise.
5.1 Motivation for Non-i.i.d. Noise
For a matrix-valued query function, the standard method for basic
mechanisms that use additive noise is by adding the independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise to each element of the matrix
query. However, as common in matrix analysis [46], the matrices
involved often have some geometric and algebraic characteristics
that can be exploited. As a result, it is usually the case that only
certain “parts” – the term which will be defined more precisely
shortly – of the matrices contain useful information. In fact, this is
one of the rationales behind many compression techniques such as
the popular principal component analysis (PCA) [6, 55, 70]. Due to
this reason, adding the same amount of noise to every “part” of the
matrix query may be highly suboptimal.
5.2 Directional Noise as a Non-i.i.d. Noise
Let us elaborate further on the “parts” of a matrix. In matrix anal-
ysis, matrix factorization [46] is often used to extract underlying
properties of a matrix. This is a family of algorithms and the spe-
cific choice depends upon the application and types of insights it
requires. Particularly, in our application, the factorization that is
informative is the singular value decomposition (SVD) (Theorem 1)
of the two covariance matrices ofMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ).
Consider first the covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rm×m , and write its
SVD as, Σ = W1ΛWT2 . It is well-known that, for the covariance
matrix, we have the equalityW1 = W2 since it is positive definite
(cf. [1, 46]). Hence, let us more concisely write the SVD of Σ as,
Σ = WΣΛΣW
T
Σ .
This representation gives us a very useful insight to the noise gener-
ated fromMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ): it tells us the directions of the noise
via the column vectors of WΣ, and variance of the noise in each
direction via the singular values in ΛΣ.
For simplicity, consider a two-dimensional multivariate Gauss-
ian distribution, i.e. m = 2, so there are two column vectors of
WΣ = [wΣ1,wΣ2]. The geometry of this distribution can be de-
picted by an ellipsoid, e.g. the dash contour in Fig. 3, Left (cf. [70,
ch. 4], [6, ch. 2]). This ellipsoid is characterized by its two principal
axes – the major and the minor axes. It is well-known that the two
column vectors from SVD, i.e. wΣ1 and wΣ2, are unit vectors point-
ing in the directions of the major and minor axes of this ellipsoid,
and more importantly, the length of each axis is characterized by its
corresponding singular value, i.e. σΣ1 and σΣ2, respectively (cf. [70,
ch. 4]) (recall from Theorem 1 that diaд(ΛΣ) = [σΣ1,σΣ2]). This is
illustrated by Fig. 3, Left. Therefore, when considering this 2D mul-
tivariate Gaussian noise, we arrive at the following interpretation
of the SVD of its covariance matrix: the noise is distributed toward
the two principal directions specified by wΣ1 and wΣ2, with the
variance scaled by the respective singular values, σΣ1 and σΣ2.
We can extend this interpretation to a more general case with
m > 2, and also to the other covariance matrix Ψ. Then, we have
a full interpretation ofMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) as follows. The matrix-
valued noise distributed according toMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) has two
components: the row-wise noise, and the column-wise noise. The
row-wise noise and the column-wise noise are characterized by the
two covariance matrices, Σ and Ψ, respectively, as follows.
For the row-wise noise.
• The row-wise noise is characterized by Σ.
• SVD of Σ = WΣΛΣWTΣ decomposes the row-wise noise into
two components – the directions and the variances of the
noise in those directions.
• The directions of the row-wise noise are specified by the
column vectors ofWΣ.
• The variance of each row-wise-noise direction is indicated
by its corresponding singular value in ΛΣ.
For the column-wise noise.
• The column-wise noise is characterized by Ψ.
• SVD of Ψ = WΨΛΨWTΨ decomposes the column-wise noise
into two components – the directions and the variances of
the noise in those directions.
• The directions of the column-wise noise are specified by the
column vectors ofWΨ .
• The variance of each column-wise-noise direction is indi-
cated by its respective singular value in ΛΨ .
SinceMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) is fully characterized by its covariances,
these two components of the matrix-valued noise drawn from
MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) provide a complete interpretation of the matrix-
variate Gaussian noise.
5.3 Directional Noise & MVG Mechanism
Wenow revisit Theorem 3. Recall that the sufficient (ϵ,δ )-differential-
privacy condition for the MVG mechanism puts the constraint only
on the singular values of Σ and Ψ. However, as we discuss in the
previous section, the singular values of Σ and Ψ only indicate the
variance of the noise in each direction, but not the directions they
are attributed to. In other words, Theorem 3 suggests that the MVG
mechanism preserves (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy as long as the overall
variances of the noise satisfy a certain threshold, but these variances
can be attributed non-uniformly in any direction.
This claim certainly warrants further discussion, and we defer it
to Sec. 6, where we present the technical detail on how to practically
implement this concept of directional noise. It is important to only
note here that this claim does not mean that we can avoid adding
noise in any particular direction altogether. On the contrary, there
is still a minimum amount of noise required in every direction for
the MVGmechanism to guarantee differential privacy, but the noise
simply can be attributed unevenly in different directions (see Fig. 3,
Right, for an example).
5.4 Utility Gain via Directional Noise
There are multiple ways to exploit the notion of directional noise
to enhance utility of differential privacy. Here, we present two
methods – via the domain knowledge and via the SVD/PCA.
5.4.1 Utilizing Domain Knowledge. This method is best described
by examples. Consider first the personalized warfarin dosing prob-
lem [31], which can be considered as the regression problem with
the identity query, f (X) = X. In the i.i.d. noise scheme, every fea-
ture used in the warfarin dosing prediction is equally perturbed.
However, domain experts may have prior knowledge that some
features are more critical than the others, so adding directional
noise designed such that the more critical features are perturbed
less can potentially yield better prediction performance.
Let us next consider a slightly more involved matrix-valued
query: the covariance matrix, i.e. f (X) = 1N XXT , where X ∈
RM×N has zero mean and the columns are the records/samples.
Consider now the Netflix prize dataset [71, 72]. A popular method
for solving the Netflix challenge is via low-rank approximation
[5], which often involves the covariance matrix query function
[8, 13, 66]. Suppose domain experts indicate that some features
are more informative than the others. Since the covariance matrix
has the underlying property that each row and column correspond
to a single feature [70], we can use this domain knowledge with
directional noise by adding less noise to the rows and columns
corresponding to the informative features.
In both examples, the directions chosen are among the standard
basis, e.g. v1 = [1, 0, . . . , 0]T , v2 = [0, 1, . . . , 0]T , which are ones of
the simplest forms of directions.
5.4.2 Using Differentially-Private SVD/PCA. When domain knowl-
edge is not available, an alternative approach is to derive the di-
rections via the SVD or PCA. In this context, SVD and PCA are
identical with the main difference being that SVD is compatible
with any matrix-valued query function, while PCA is best suited to
the identity query. Hence, the terms may be used interchangeable
in the subsequent discussion.
As we show in Sec. 5.2, SVD/PCA can decompose a matrix into
its directions and variances. Hence, we can set aside a small portion
of privacy budget to derive the directions from the SVD/PCA of
the query function. This is illustrated in the following example.
Consider again the warfarin dosing problem [31], and assume that
we do not possess any prior knowledge about the predictive fea-
tures. We can learn this information from the data by spending a
small privacy budget on deriving differentially-private principal
components (P.C.). Each P.C. can then serve as a direction and, with
directional noise, we can selectively add less noise in the highly
informative directions as indicated by PCA.
Clearly, the directions in this example are not necessary among
the standard basis, but can be any unit vector. This example illus-
trates how directional noise can provide additional utility benefit
even without the domain knowledge. There have been many works
on differentially-private SVD/PCA [7, 8, 13, 27, 38–40, 53], so this
method is very generally applicable. Again, we reiterate that the
approach similar to the one in the example using SVD applies to
a general matrix-valued query function. Fig. 3, Right, illustrates
this. In the illustration, the query function has two dimensions,
and we have obtained the utility direction, e.g. from SVD, as rep-
resented by the green line. This can be considered as the utility
subspace we desire to be least perturbed. The many small circles in
the illustration represent how the i.i.d. noise and directional noise
are distributed under the 2D multivariate Gaussian distribution.
Clearly, directional noise can reduce the perturbation experienced
on the utility directions.
In the next section, we discuss how to implement directional
noise with the MVGmechanism in practice and propose two simple
algorithms for two types of directional noise.
6 PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The differential privacy condition in Theorem 3, even along with
the notion of directional noise in the previous section, still leads to
a large design space for the MVG mechanism. In this section, we
present two simple algorithms to implement the MVG mechanism
with two types of directional noise that can be appropriate for awide
range of real-world applications. Then, we conclude the section
with a discussion on a sampling algorithm forMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ).
As discussed in Sec. 5.3, Theorem 3 states that the MVG mech-
anism satisfies (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy as long as the singular
values of Σ and Ψ satisfy the sufficient condition. This provides
tremendous flexibility in the choice of the directions of the noise.
First, we notice from the sufficient condition in Theorem 3 that the
singular values for Σ and Ψ are decoupled, i.e. they can be designed
independently so long as, when combined, they satisfy the specified
condition. Hence, the row-wise noise and column-wise noise can be
considered as the two modes of noise in the MVG mechanism. By
this terminology, we discuss two types of directional noise: the
unimodal and equi-modal directional noise.
6.1 Unimodal Directional Noise
For the unimodal directional noise, we select one mode of the noise
to be directional noise, whereas the other mode of the noise is set
to be i.i.d. For this discussion, we assume that the row-wise noise
is directional noise, while the column-wise noise is i.i.d. However,
the opposite case can be readily analyzed with the similar analysis.
We note that, apart from simplifying the practical implementa-
tion that we will discuss shortly, this type of directional noise can
be appropriate for many applications. For example, for the identity
query, we may not possess any prior knowledge on the quality
of each sample, so the best strategy would be to consider the i.i.d.
column-wise noise (recall that samples are the column vectors).
Formally, the unimodal directional noise sets Ψ = In , where In
is the n × n identity matrix. This, consequently, reduces the design
space for the MVG mechanism with directional noise to only that
of Σ. Next, consider the left side of Eq. (1), and we haveσ (Σ−1)2 =
√
m∑
i=1
1
σ 2i (Σ)
, and
σ (Ψ−1)2 = √n. (2)
If we square both sides of the sufficient condition and re-arrange
it, we get a form of the condition such that the row-wise noise in
each direction is decoupled:
m∑
i=1
1
σ 2i (Σ)
≤ 1
n
(−β +
√
β2 + 8αϵ)4
16α4
. (3)
This form gives a very intuitive interpretation of the directional
noise. First, we note that, to have small noise in the ith direction,
σi (Σ) has to be small (cf. Sec. 5.2). However, the sum of 1/σ 2i (Σ) of
the noise in all directions, which should hence be large, is limited
by the quantity on the right side of Eq. (3). This, in fact, explains
why even with directional noise, we still need to add noise in every
direction to guarantee differential privacy. Consider the case when
we set the noise in one direction to be zero, andwe have lim
σ→0
1
σ = ∞,
which immediately violates the sufficient condition in Eq. (3).
From Eq. (3), the quantity 1/σ 2i (Σ) is the inverse of the variance
of the noise in the ith direction, so wemay think of it as the precision
measure of the query answer in that direction. The intuition is that
the higher this value is, the lower the noise added in that direction,
and, hence, the more precise the query value in that direction is.
From this description, the constraint in Eq. (3) can be aptly named
as the precision budget, and we immediately have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. For the MVG mechanism with Ψ = In , the precision
budget is (−β +
√
β2 + 8αϵ)4/(16α4n).
Finally, the remaining task is to determine the directions of the
noise and form Σ accordingly. To do so systematically, we first
decompose Σ by SVD as,
Σ = WΣΛΣW
T
Σ .
This decomposition represents Σ by two components – the direc-
tions of the row-wise noise indicated byWΣ, and the variance of
the noise indicated by ΛΣ. Since the precision budget only puts
constraint upon ΛΣ, this decomposition allows us to freely chose
any unitary matrix forWΣ such that each column ofWΣ indicates
each independent direction of the noise.
Algorithm 1MVG mech. w/ unimodal directional noise.
Input: (a) privacy parameters: ϵ,δ ; (b) the query function and its
sensitivity: f (X) ∈ Rm×n , s2(f ); (c) the precision allocation
strategy θ ∈ (0, 1)m : |θ |1 = 1; and (d) them directions of the
row-wise noiseWΣ ∈ Rm×m .
(1) Compute α and β (cf. Theorem 3).
(2) Compute the precision budget P = (−β+
√
β 2+8αϵ )4
16α 4n .
(3) for i = 1, . . . ,m:
i) Set pi = θiP .
ii) Compute the ith direction’s variance, σi (Σ) = 1/√pi .
(4) Form the diagonal matrix ΛΣ = diaд([σ1(Σ), . . . ,σm (Σ)]).
(5) Derive the covariance matrix: Σ = WΣΛΣWTΣ .
(6) Draw a matrix-valued noiseZ fromMVGm,n (0, Σ, I).
Output: f (X) +Z.
Therefore, we present the following simple approach to design
the MVG mechanism with the unimodal directional noise: under a
given precision budget, allocate more precision to the directions of
more importance.
Alg. 1 formalizes this procedure. It takes as inputs, among other
parameters, the precision allocation strategy θ ∈ (0, 1)m , and the di-
rections WΣ ∈ Rm×m . The precision allocation strategy is a vector
of sizem, whose elements, θi ∈ (0, 1), corresponds to the impor-
tance of the ith direction indicated by the ith orthonormal column
vector ofWΣ. The higher the value of θi , the more important the
ith direction is. Moreover, the algorithm enforces that
∑m
i=1 θi ≤ 1
to ensure that the precision budget is not overspent. The algorithm
proceeds as follows. First, compute α and β and, then, the preci-
sion budget P . Second, assign precision to each direction based
on the precision allocation strategy. Third, derive the variance of
the noise in each direction accordingly. Then, compute Σ from the
noise variance and directions, and draw a matrix-valued noise from
MVGm,n (0, Σ, I). Finally, output the query answer with additive
matrix noise.
We make a remark here about choosing directions of the noise.
As discussed in Sec. 5, any orthonormal set of vectors can be used
as the directions. The simplest instance is the the standard basis
vectors, e.g. e1 = [1, 0, 0]T , e2 = [0, 1, 0]T , e3 = [0, 0, 1]T for R3.
6.2 Equi-Modal Directional Noise
Next, we consider the type of directional noise of which the row-
wise noise and column-wise noise are distributed identically, which
we call the equi-modal directional noise. We recommend this type
of directional noise for a symmetric query function, i.e. f (X) =
f (X)T ∈ Rm×m . This covers a wide-range of query functions in-
cluding the covariance matrix [8, 13, 27], the kernel matrix [55], the
adjacency matrix of an undirected graph [34], and the Laplacian
matrix [34]. The motivation for this recommendation is that, for
symmetric query functions, any prior information about the rows
would similarly apply to the columns, so it is reasonable to use
identical row-wise and column-wise noise.
Algorithm 2MVG mech. w/ equi-modal directional noise.
Input: (a) privacy parameters: ϵ,δ ; (b) the query function and its
sensitivity: f (X) ∈ Rm×m , s2(f ); (c) the precision allocation
strategy θ ∈ (0, 1)m : |θ |1 = 1; and (d) them noise directions
WΣ ∈ Rm×m .
(1) Compute α and β (cf. Theorem 3).
(2) Compute the precision budget P = (−β+
√
β 2+8αϵ )2
4α 2 .
(3) for i = 1, . . . ,m:
i) Set pi = θiP .
ii) Compute the the ith direction’s variance, σi (Σ) = 1/√pi .
(4) Form the diagonal matrix ΛΣ = diaд([σ1(Σ), . . . ,σm (Σ)]).
(5) Derive the covariance matrix: Σ = WΣΛΣWTΣ .
(6) Draw a matrix-valued noiseZ fromMVGm,m (0, Σ, Σ).
Output: f (X) +Z.
Formally, this type of directional noise imposes that Ψ = Σ.
Following a similar derivation to the unimodal type, we have the
following precision budget.
Theorem 5. For the MVG mechanism with Ψ = Σ, the precision
budget is (−β +
√
β2 + 8αϵ)2/(4α2).
Following a similar procedure to the unimodal type, we present
Alg. 2 for the MVG mechanism with the equi-modal directional
noise. The algorithm follows the same steps as Alg. 1, except it
derives the precision budget from Theorem 5, and draws the noise
fromMVGm,m (0, Σ, Σ).
6.3 Sampling fromMVGm,n(0, Σ,Ψ)
One remaining question on the practical implementation of the
MVG mechanism is how to efficiently draw the noise from the
matrix-variate Gaussian distributionMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ). One ap-
proach to implement a sampler for MVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) is via the
affine transformation of samples drawn i.i.d. from the standard
normal distribution, i.e. N(0, 1). The transformation is described
by the following lemma [16].
Lemma 4. Let N ∈ Rm×n be a matrix-valued random variable
whose elements are drawn i.i.d. from the standard normal distribution
N(0, 1). Then, the matrix Z = BΣNBTΨ is distributed according to
Z ∼ MVGm,n (0,BΣBTΣ ,BΨBTΨ).
This transformation consequently allows the conversion be-
tweenmn samples drawn i.i.d. from N(0, 1) and a sample drawn
fromMVGm,n (0,BΣBTΣ ,BΨBTΨ). To derive BΣ and BΨ from given
Σ and Ψ forMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ), we solve the two linear equations:
BΣBTΣ = Σ, and BΨB
T
Ψ
= Ψ, and the solutions of these two equa-
tions can be acquired readily via the Cholesky decomposition or
SVD (cf. [46]). We summarize the steps for this implementation
here using SVD:
(1) Drawmn i.i.d. samples from N(0, 1), and form a matrix N .
(2) Let BΣ = WΣΛ
1/2
Σ
and BΨ = WΨΛ
1/2
Ψ
, where WΣ,ΛΣ and
WΨ,ΛΨ are derived from SVD of Σ and Ψ, respectively.
(3) Compute the sampleZ = BΣNBTΨ .
The complexity of this method depends on that of the N(0, 1) sam-
pler used. Plus, there is an additional O(max{m3,n3}) complexity
from SVD [35]3. The memory needed is in the order ofm2+n2+mn
from the three matrices required in step (3).
7 EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS
We evaluate the proposed MVG mechanism on three experimental
setups and datasets. Table 2 summarizes our setups. In all experi-
ments, 100 trials are carried out and the average and 95% confidence
interval are reported.
7.1 Experiment I: Regression
7.1.1 Task and Dataset. The first experiment considers the regres-
sion application on the Liver Disorders dataset [61, 65], which
contains 5 features from the blood sample of 345 patients. We leave
out the samples from 97 patients for testing, so the private dataset
contains 248 patients. Following suggestions by Forsyth and Rada
[30], we use these features to predict the average daily alcohol
consumption. All features and teacher values are ∈ [0, 1].
7.1.2 Query Function and Evaluation Metric. We perform regres-
sion in a differentially-private manner via the identity query, i.e.
f (X) = X. Since regression involves the teacher values, we treat
them as a feature, so the query size becomes 6 × 248. We use the
kernel ridge regression (KRR) [55, 78] as the regressor, and the
root-mean-square error (RMSE) [55, 70] as the evaluation metric.
7.1.3 MVG Mechanism Design. As discussed in Sec. 6.1, Alg. 1 is
appropriate for the identity query, so we employ it for this exper-
iment. The L2-sensitivity of this query is
√
6 (cf. Appendix B). To
identify the informative directions to allocate the precision budget,
we implement both methods discussed in Sec. 5.4 as follows.
(a) For the method using domain knowledge (denoted MVG-1),
we refer to Alatalo et al. [3], which indicates that alanine amino-
transferase (ALT) is the most indicative feature for predicting the
alcohol consumption behavior. Additionally, from our prior expe-
rience working with regression problems, we anticipate that the
teacher value (Y) is another important feature to allocate more pre-
cision budget to. With this setup, we use the standard basis vectors
as the directions (cf. Sec. 5.4), and employ the following binary
precision allocation strategy.
• Allocate τ% of the precision budget to the two important
features (ALT and Y) by equal amount.
• Allocate the rest of the precision budget equally to the rest
of the features.
We vary τ ∈ {55, 65, . . . , 95} and report the best results.4
(b) For the method using differentially-private SVD/PCA (de-
noted MVG-2), given the total budget of {ϵ,δ } reported in Sec. 8,
we spend 0.2ϵ and 0.2δ on the derivation of the two most infor-
mative directions via the differentially-private PCA algorithm in
[8]. We specify the first two principal components as the indicative
features for a fair comparison with the method using domain knowl-
edge. The remaining 0.8ϵ and 0.8δ are then used for Alg. 1. Again,
3Note that n here is not the number of samples or records but is the dimension of the
matrix-valued query output, i.e. f (X) ∈ Rm×n .
4In the real-world deployment, this parameter selection process should also be made
private [14].
Exp. I Exp. II Exp. III
Task Regression 1st P.C. Covariance
estimation
Dataset Liver [30, 61] Movement [4] CTG [18, 61]
# samples N 248 2,021 2,126
# featuresM 6 4 21
Query f (X) X XXT /N X
Query size 6 × 248 4 × 4 21 × 2126
Eval. metric RMSE ∆ρ (Eq. (4)) RSS (Eq. (5))
MVG Alg. 1 2 1
Source of
directions
Domain
knowledge
[3] /PCA [8]
Data
collection
setup [4]
Domain
knowledge
[83]
Table 2: The three experimental setups.
for a fair comparison with the method using domain knowledge,
we use the same binary precision allocation strategy in Alg. 1 for
MVG-2.
7.2 Experiment II: 1st Principal Component
7.2.1 Task and Dataset. The second experiment considers the prob-
lem of determining the first principal component (1st P.C.) from
the principal component analysis (PCA). This is one of the most
popular problems in machine learning and differential privacy. We
only consider the first principal component for two reasons. First,
many prior works in differentially-private PCA algorithm consider
this problem or the similar problem of deriving a few major P.C. (cf.
[7, 13, 27]), so this allows us to compare our approach to the state-
of-the-art approaches of a well-studied problem. Second, in practice,
this method for deriving the 1st P.C. may be used iteratively to
derive the rest of the principal components (cf. [51]).
We use the Movement Prediction via RSS (Movement) dataset
[4], which consists of the radio signal strength measurement from
4 sensor anchors (ANC{0-3}) – corresponding to the 4 features –
from 2,021 movement samples. The feature data all have the range
of [−1, 1].
7.2.2 Query Function and Evaluation Metric. We consider the co-
variance matrix query, i.e. f (X) = 1N XXT , and use SVD to derive
the 1st P.C. from it. Hence, the query size is 4 × 4. We adopt the
quality metric commonly used for P.C. [55] and also used by Dwork
et al. [27], i.e. the captured variance ρ. For a given P.C. v, the capture
variance by v on the covariance matrix S¯ is defined as ρ = vT S¯v.
To be consistent with other experiments, we report the absolute
error in ρ as deviated from the maximum ρ. It is well-established
that the maximum ρ is equal to the largest eigenvalue of S¯ (cf. [46,
Theorem 4.2.2], [82]). Hence, the metric can be written as,
∆ρ(v) = λ1 − ρ(v), (4)
where λ1 is the largest eigenvalue of S¯. For the ideal, non-private
case, the error would clearly be zero.
7.2.3 MVG Mechanism Design. As discussed in Sec. 6.2, Alg. 2
is appropriate for the covariance query, so we employ it for this
experiment. The L2-sensitivity of this query is 8/2021 (cf. Appendix
B). To identify the informative directions to allocate the precision
budget, we inspect the data collection setup described in [4], and
use two of the four anchors as the more informative anchors due to
their proximity to the movement path (ANC0 and ANC3). Hence,
we use the standard basis vectors as the directions (cf. Sec. 6) and
allocate more precision budget to these two features using the same
strategy as in Exp. I.
7.3 Experiment III: Covariance Estimation
7.3.1 Task and Dataset. The third experiment considers the similar
problem to Exp. II but with a different flavor. In this experiment,
we consider the task of estimating the covariance matrix from the
perturbed database. This differs from Exp. II in three ways. First,
for covariance estimation, we are interested in every P.C. Second,
as mentioned in Exp. II, many previous works do not consider
every P.C., so the previous works for comparison are different.
Third, to give a different taste of our approach, we consider the
method of input perturbation for estimating the covariance, i.e.
query the noisy database and use it to compute the covariance. We
use the Cardiotocography (CTG) dataset [18, 61], which consists of
21 features in the range of [0, 1] from 2,126 fetal samples.
7.3.2 Query Function and EvaluationMetric. We consider themethod
via input perturbation, so we use the identity query, i.e. f (X) = X.
The query size is 21 × 2126. We adopt the captured variance as
the quality metric similar to Exp. II, but since we are interested
in every P.C., we consider the residual sum of square (RSS) [32]
of every P.C. This is similar to the total residual variance used by
Dwork et al. ([27, p. 5]). Formally, given the perturbed database X˜,
the covariance estimate is S˜ = 1N X˜X˜
T . Let {v˜i } be the set of P.C.’s
derived from S˜, and the RSS is,
RSS(S˜) =
∑
i
(λi − ρ(v˜i ))2, (5)
where λi is the ith eigenvalue of S¯ (cf. Exp. II), and ρ(v˜i ) is the
captured variance of the ith P.C. derived from S˜. Clearly, in the
non-private case, RSS(S¯) = 0.
7.3.3 MVG Mechanism Design. Since we consider the identity
query, we employ Alg. 1 for this experiment. The L2-sensitivity
is
√
21 (cf. Appendix B). To identify the informative directions to
allocate the precision budget to, we refer to the domain knowledge
from Costa Santos et al. [83], which identifies three features to be
most informative, viz. fetal heart rate (FHR), %time with abnormal
short term variability (ASV), and %time with abnormal long term
variability (ALV). Hence, we use the standard basis vectors as the di-
rections and allocate more precision budget to these three features
using the same strategy as in Exp. I.
7.4 Comparison to Previous Works
Since our approach falls into the category of basic mechanism, we
compare our work to the four prior state-of-the-art basic mecha-
nisms discussed in Sec. 2.1, namely, the Laplace mechanism, the
Gaussian mechanism, the Exponential mechanism, and the JL trans-
form method.
For Exp. I and III, since we consider the identity query, the four
previous works for comparison are by Dwork et al. [24], Dwork
Method ϵ δ RMSE (×10−2)
Non-private - - 1.226
Random guess - - ∼ 3.989
MVG-1 (Alg. 1 + knowledge in [3]) 1. 1/N 1.624 ± 0.026
MVG-2 (Alg. 1 + DP-PCA [8]) 1. 1/N 1.643 ± 0.023
Gaussian (Dwork et al. [23]) 1. 1/N 1.913 ± 0.069
JL transform (Upadhyay [86]) 1. 1/N 1.682 ± 0.015
Laplace (Dwork et al. [24]) 1. 0 2.482 ± 0.189
Exponential (Blum et al. [9]) 1. 0 2.202 ± 0.721
Table 3: Results fromExp. I: regression.MVG-1 derives noise
directions from domain knowledge, while MVG-2 derives
them from differentially-private PCA in [8].
et al. [23], Blum et al. [9], and Upadhyay [86], for the four basic
mechanisms, respectively.
For Exp. II, we consider the 1st P.C. As this problem has been
well-investigated, we compare our approach to the state-of-the-art
algorithms specially designed for this problem. These four algo-
rithms using the four prior basic mechanisms are, respectively:
Dwork et al. [24], Dwork et al. [27], Chaudhuri et al. [13], and
Blocki et al. [7]. We note that these four algorithms chosen for com-
parison are designed and optimized specifically for the particular
application, so they utilize the positive-semidefinite (PSD) nature
of the matrix query. On the other hand, the MVG mechanism used
here is generally applicable for matrix queries even beyond the
particular application, and makes no assumptions about the PSD
structure of the matrix query. In other words, we intentionally give
a favorable edge to the compared methods to show that, despite the
handicap, the MVG mechanism can still perform comparably well.
For all previous works, we use the parameter values as suggested
by the authors of the method, and vary the free variable before
reporting the best performance.
Finally, we recognize that some of these prior works have a
different privacy guarantee from ours, namely, ϵ-differential privacy.
Nevertheless, we present these prior works for comprehensive
coverage of prior basic mechanisms, andwewill keep this difference
in mind when discussing the results.
8 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 report the experimental results for
Experiment I, II, and III, respectively. The performance shown is an
average over 100 trials, along with the 95% confidence interval.
8.1 Experiment I: Regression
Table 3 reports the results for Exp. I. Here are the key observations.
• Compared to the non-private baseline, the best MVG mecha-
nism (MVG-1) yields similar performance (difference of .004
in RMSE).
• Compared to other (ϵ,δ )-basic mechanisms, i.e. the Gaussian
mechanism and the JL transform, the best MVG mechanism
(MVG-1) has better utility (by .003 and .0006 in RMSE, re-
spectively) with the same privacy guarantee.
• Compared to other ϵ-basic mechanisms, i.e. the Laplace and
Exponential mechanisms, the best MVGmechanism (MVG-1)
Method ϵ δ Err. ∆ρ (·10−1)
Non-private - - 0
Random guess - - ∼ 3.671
MVG (Alg. 2) 1. 1/N 2.384 ± 0.215
Gaussian (Dwork et al. [27]) 1. 1/N 2.485 ± 0.207
JL transform (Blocki et al. [7]) 1. 1/N 2.394 ± 0.216
Laplace (Dwork et al. [24]) 1. 0 2.634 ± 0.174
Exponential (Chaudhuri et al. [13]) 1. 0 2.455 ± 0.209
Table 4: Results from Exp. II: first principal component.
provides significantly better utility (~150%) with the slightly
weaker (ϵ, 1/N )-differential privacy guarantee.
• Even when some privacy budget is spent on deriving the di-
rection via PCA[8] (MVG-2), the MVGmechanism still yields
the best performance among all other non-MVG methods.
Overall, the results from regression show the promise of the MVG
mechanism. Our approach can outperform all other (ϵ,δ )-basic
mechanisms. Although it provides a weaker privacy guarantee
than other ϵ-basic mechanisms, it can provide considerably more
utility (~150%). As advocated by Duchi et al. [19] and Fienberg et al.
[28], this trade-off could be attractive in some settings, e.g. critical
medical or emergency situations.
8.2 Experiment II: 1st Principal Component
Table 4 reports the results for Exp. II. Here are the key observations.
• Compared to the non-private baseline, the MVG mechanism
has reasonably small error ∆ρ of 0.2387.
• Compared to other (ϵ,δ )-basic mechanisms, i.e. the Gauss-
ian mechanism and the JL transform, the MVG mechanism
provides better utility with the same privacy guarantee (.01
and .0001 smaller error ∆ρ, respectively).
• Compared to other ϵ-basic mechanisms, i.e. the Laplace
and Exponential mechanisms, the MVG mechanism yields
higher utility with slightly weaker (ϵ, 1/N )-differential pri-
vacy guarantee (.03 and .01 smaller error ∆ρ, respectively).
Overall, the MVG mechanism provides the best utility. Though we
admit that, with a weaker privacy guarantee, it does not provide
significant utility increase over the Exponential mechanism by
Chaudhuri et al. [13]. Nevertheless, this method [13] utilizes the
positive-semidefinite (PSD) characteristic of the matrix query and is
known to be among the best algorithms for this specific task. On the
other hand, the MVG mechanism used in the experiment is more
general. Furthermore, we show in the full version of this work that,
when utilizing the PSD characteristic of the query function, the
MVG mechanism can significantly outperform all three methods
being compared here [11]. Again, in some applications, this trade-
off of weaker privacy for better utility might be desirable [19, 28],
and the MVG mechanism clearly provides the best trade-off.
8.3 Experiment III: Covariance Estimation
Table 5 reports the results for Exp. III. Here are the key observations.
• Compared to the non-private baseline, the MVG mechanism
has very small RSS error of .06657.
Figure 4: Effect of noise directions on the utility (all with δ = 1/N ). (Left) Exp. I: regression on the Liver dataset. The four
directions shown put more precision budget on the following features: (a) {ALT, Y}, (b) {ALT}, (c) {Y}, (d) {ALT, AST, Y}. (Middle)
Exp. II: 1st P.C. on the Movement dataset. The four directions emphasize the following features: (a) {ANC0, ANC3}, (b) {ANC0},
(c) {ANC3}, (d) {ANC1, ANC2}. (Right) Exp. III: covariance estimation on the CTG dataset. The two directions emphasize the
two disjoint subsets of features: (a) {FHR, ASV, ALV}, (b) The rest of the features.
Method ϵ δ RSS (×10−2)
Non-private - - 0
Random guess - - ∼ 12.393
MVG (Alg. 1) 1. 1/N 6.657 ± 0.193
Gaussian (Dwork et al. [23]) 1. 1/N 7.029 ± 0.216
JL transform (Upadhyay [86]) 1. 1/N 6.718 ± 0.229
Laplace (Dwork et al. [24]) 1. 0 7.109 ± 0.211
Exponential (Blum et al. [9]) 1. 0 7.223 ± 0.211
Table 5: Results from Exp. III: covariance estimation.
• Compared to other (ϵ,δ )-basic mechanisms, i.e. the Gauss-
ian mechanism and the JL transform, the MVG mechanism
provides better utility with the same privacy guarantee (.004
and .001 smaller RSS error, respectively).
• Compared to other ϵ-basic mechanisms, i.e. the Laplace and
Exponential mechanisms, the MVG mechanism gives bet-
ter utility with slightly weaker (ϵ, 1/N )-differential privacy
guarantee (.005 and .006 smaller RSS error, respectively).
Overall, the MVG mechanism provides the best utility (smallest
error). When compared to other methods with stronger privacy
guarantee, the MVG mechanism can provide much higher utility.
Again, we point out that in some settings, the trade-off of weaker
privacy for better utility might be favorable [19, 28], and our ap-
proach provides the best trade-off.
9 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORKS
9.1 Effect of Directional Noise on Utility
In Sec. 5.4, we discuss how the choice of noise directions can affect
the utility. Here, we investigate this effect on the obtained utility
in the three experiments. Fig. 4 depicts our results.
Fig. 4, Left, shows the direction comparison from Exp. I. We
compare four choices of directions. Direction (a), which uses the
domain knowledge (ALT) and the teacher label (Y), yields the best
result when compared to: (b) using only the domain knowledge
Method Runtime (ms)Exp. I Exp. II Exp. III
MVG 36.2 1.8 3.2 × 103
Gaussian ([23], [27]) 1.0 0.4 10.0
JL transform ([86], [7]) 192.7 637.4 2.57 × 106
Laplace ([24]) 0.4 0.5 8.0
Exponential ([9], [13]) 627.2 2,112.7 2.00 × 106
Table 6: Runtime of each method on the three experiments.
(ALT), (c) using only the teacher label (Y), and (d) using an arbitrary
extra feature (ALT+Y+AST).
Fig. 4, Middle, shows the direction comparison from Exp. II. We
compare four choices of directions. Direction (a), which makes full
use of the prior information (ANC0 and ANC3), performs best when
compared to: (b), (c) using only partial prior information (ANC0 or
ANC3, respectively), and (d) having the wrong priors completely
(ANC1 and ANC2).
Fig. 4, Right, shows the comparison from Exp. III. We compare
three choices of directions. Direction (a), which uses the domain
knowledge (FHR, ASV, ALV3), gives the best performance compared
to: (b) using the completely wrong priors (all other features), and
(c) having no prior at all (i.i.d.).
The results illustrate three key points. First, as seen in all three
plots in Fig. 4, the choice of directions has an effect on the per-
formance. Second, as indicated by Fig. 4, Right, directional noise
performs much better than i.i.d. noise. Third, as seen in Fig. 4, Left
and Middle, there may be multiple instances of directional noise
that can lead to comparable performance. The last observation
shows the promise of the notion of directional noise, as it signals
the robustness of the approach.
9.2 Runtime Comparison
Next, we present the empirical runtime comparison between the
MVG mechanism and the compared methods in Table 6. The exper-
iments are run on an AMD Opteron 6320 Processor with 4 cores
using Python 2.7, along with NumPy [77], SciPy [52], Scikit-learn
[78], and emcee [29] packages. The results show that, although the
MVG mechanism runs much slower than the Gaussian and Laplace
mechanisms, it runs much faster than the JL transform and the
Exponential mechanism.
Both observations are as expected. First, the MVG mechanism
runs slower than the i.i.d.-based Gaussian and Laplace mechanisms
because it incurs the computational overhead of deriving the non-
i.i.d. noise. The amount of overhead depends on the size of the query
output as discussed in Sec. 6.3. Second, the MVG mechanism runs
much faster than the JL transform because, in addition to requiring
SVD to modify the singular values of the matrix query and i.i.d.
Gaussian samples similar to the MVG mechanism, the JL transform
has a runtime overhead for the construction of its projection matrix,
which consists of multiple matrix multiplications. Finally, the MVG
mechanism runsmuch faster than the Exponential mechanism since
drawing samples from the distribution defined by the Exponential
mechanism may not be efficient.
9.3 Directional Noise as a Generalized
Subspace Projection
Directional noise provides utility gain by adding less noise in useful
directions and more in the others. This has a connection to subspace
projection or dimensionality reduction, which simply removes the
non-useful directions. The main difference between the two is that,
in directional noise, the non-useful directions are kept, although are
highly perturbed. However, despite being highly perturbed, these
directions may still be able to contribute to the utility performance.
We test this hypothesis by running two additional regression
experiments (Exp. I) as follows. Given the same two important
features (ALT & Y), we use the Gaussian mechanism [23] and the
JL transform method [86] to perform the regression task using
only these two features. With ϵ = 1 and δ = 1/N , the results are
(2.538 ± .065) × 10−2 and (2.863 ± .022) × 10−2 of RMSE, respec-
tively. Noticeably, these results are significantly worse than that
of the MVG mechanism, with the same privacy guarantee. Specifi-
cally, by incorporating all features with directional noise via the
MVG mechanism, we can achieve over 150% gain in utility over the
dimensionality reduction alternatives.
9.4 Exploiting Structural Characteristics of the
Matrices
In this work, we derive the sufficient condition for the MVG mecha-
nism without making any assumption on the query function. How-
ever, many practical matrix-valued query functions have a spe-
cific structure, e.g. the covariance matrix is positive semi definite
(PSD) [46], the Laplacianmatrix [34] is symmetric. Therefore, future
works may look into exploiting these intrinsic characteristics of
the matrices in the derivation of the differential-privacy condition
for the MVG mechanism.
9.5 Precision Allocation Strategy Design
Alg. 1 and Alg. 2 take as an input the precision allocation strategy
vector θ ∈ (0, 1)m :θ 1 = 1. Elements of θ are chosen to emphasize
how informative or useful each direction is. The design of θ to
optimize the utility gain via the directional noise is an interesting
topic for future research. For example, in our experiments, we use
the intuition that our prior knowledge only tells us whether the
directions are highly informative or not, but we do not know the
granularity of the level of usefulness of these directions. Hence,
we adopt the binary allocation strategy, i.e. give most precision
budget to the useful directions in equal amount, and give the rest of
the budget to the other directions in equal amount. An interesting
direction for future work is to investigate general instances when
the knowledge about the directions is more granular.
10 CONCLUSION
We study the matrix-valued query function in differential privacy,
and present the MVG mechanism that is designed specifically for
this type of query function. We prove that the MVG mechanism
guarantees (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy, and, consequently, introduce
the novel concept of directional noise, which can be used to reduce
the impact of the noise on the utility of the query answer. Finally,
we evaluate our approach experimentally for three matrix-valued
query functions on three privacy-sensitive datasets, and the results
show that our approach can provide the utility improvement over
existing methods in all of the experiments.
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A FULL PROOF OF (ϵ,δ )-DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY
We present the full proof of the sufficient condition for the MVG
mechanism to guarantee (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy presented in
Theorem 3 here.
Proof. The MVG mechanism guarantees differential privacy if
for every pair of neighboring datasets {X1,X2} and all possible
measurable sets S ⊆ Rm×n ,
Pr [f (X1) +Z ∈ S] ≤ exp(ϵ) Pr [f (X2) +Z ∈ S] .
The proof now follows by observing that (Lemma 4),
Z = WΣΛ1/2Σ NΛ
1/2
Ψ
WTΨ,
and defining the following events:
R1 = {N : ∥N ∥2F ≤ ζ (δ )2}, R2 = {N : ∥N ∥2F > ζ (δ )2},
where ζ (δ ) is defined in Theorem 2. Next, observe that
Pr [f (X1) +Z ∈ S]
= Pr [({ f (X1) +Z ∈ S} ∩ R1) ∪ ({ f (X1) +Z ∈ S} ∩ R2)]
≤ Pr [{ f (X1) +Z ∈ S} ∩ R1] + Pr [{ f (X1) +Z ∈ S} ∩ R2] ,
where the last inequality follows from the union bound. By Theorem
2 and the definition of the set R2, we have,
Pr [{ f (X1) +Z ∈ S} ∩ R2] ≤ Pr [R2] = 1 − Pr [R1] ≤ δ .
In the rest of the proof, we find sufficient conditions for the
following inequality to hold:
Pr [f (X1) +Z ∈ (S ∩ R1)] ≤ exp(ϵ) Pr [f (X2) +Z ∈ S] .
this would complete the proof of differential privacy guarantee.
Using the definition ofMVGm,n (0, Σ,Ψ) (Definition 2), this is
satisfied if we have,∫
S∩R1
e {−
1
2 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X1))T Σ−1(Y−f (X1))]}dY ≤
eϵ
∫
S∩R1
e {−
1
2 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X2))T Σ−1(Y−f (X2))]}dY.
By inserting exp{−
1
2 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X2))T Σ−1(Y−f (X2))]}
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(Y−f (X2))T Σ−1(Y−f (X2))]}
inside the inte-
gral on the left side, it is sufficient to show that
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(Y − f (X1))T Σ−1(Y − f (X1))]}
exp{− 12 tr[Ψ−1(Y − f (X2))T Σ−1(Y − f (X2))]}
≤ exp(ϵ),
for all Y ∈ S∩R1. With some algebraic manipulations, the left hand
side of this condition can be expressed as,
= exp{−12 tr[Ψ
−1YT Σ−1(f (X2) − f (X1))
+ Ψ−1(f (X2) − f (X1))T Σ−1Y]}
− Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2) + Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)
= exp{ 12 tr[Ψ
−1YT Σ−1∆ + Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y
+ Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2) − Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)]},
where ∆ = f (X1) − f (X2). This quantity has to be bounded by
≤ exp(ϵ), so we present the following characteristic equation, which
has to be satisfied for all possible neighboring {X1,X2} and all
Y ∈ S∩ R1, for the MVG mechanism to guarantee (ϵ,δ )-differential
privacy:
tr[Ψ−1YT Σ−1∆ + Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y
+Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2) − Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)] ≤ 2ϵ .
Specifically, we want to show that this inequality holds with proba-
bility 1 − δ .
From the characteristic equation, the proof analyzes the four
terms in the sum separately since the trace is additive.
The first term: tr[Ψ−1YT Σ−1∆]. First, let us denote Y = f (X) +
Z, where f (X) and Z are any possible instances of the query
and the noise, respectively. Then, we can rewrite the first term
as, tr[Ψ−1 f (X)T Σ−1∆] + tr[Ψ−1ZT Σ−1∆]. The earlier part can be
bounded from Lemma 2:
tr[Ψ−1 f (X)T Σ−1∆] ≤
r∑
i=1
σi (Ψ−1 f (X)T )σi (∆T Σ−1).
Lemma 1 can then be used to bound each singular value. In more
detail,
σi (Ψ−1 f (X)T ) ≤
Ψ−1 f (X)T F√
i
≤
Ψ−1F ∥ f (X)∥F√
i
,
where the last inequality is via the sub-multiplicative property of a
matrix norm [69]. It is well-known that
Ψ−1F = σ (Ψ−1)2 (cf.
[46, p. 342]), and since γ = supX
f (X)F ,
σi (Ψ−1 f (X)T ) ≤ γ
σ (Ψ−1)2 /√i .
Applying the same steps to the other singular value, and using
Definition 3, we can write,
σi (∆T Σ−1) ≤ s2(f )
σ (Σ−1)2 /√i .
By substituting the two singular value bounds, the earlier part of
the first term can be bounded by,
tr[Ψ−1 f (X)T Σ−1∆]
≤γs2(f )Hr
σ (Σ−1)2 σ (Ψ−1)2 . (6)
The latter part of the first term is more complicated since it
involvesZ, so we will derive the bound in more detail. First, let us
define N to be drawn fromMVGm,n (0, Im , In ), so we can write
Z in terms of N using affine transformation [16]: Z = BΣNBTΨ .
To specify BΣ and BΨ , we solve the following linear equations,
respectively,
BΣB
T
Σ = Σ;BΨB
T
Ψ = Ψ.
This can be readily solved with SVD (cf. [46, p. 440]); hence, BΣ =
WΣΛ
1
2
Σ
, andBΨ = WΨΛ
1
2
Ψ
, where Σ = WΣΛΣWTΣ , andΨ = WΨΛΨW
T
Ψ
from SVD. Therefore,Z can be written as,
Z = WΣΛ1/2Σ NΛ
1/2
Ψ
WTΨ .
Substituting into the latter part of the first term yields,
tr[Ψ−1ZT Σ−1∆] = tr[WΨΛ−1/2Ψ NΛ
−1/2
Σ
WTΣ∆].
This can be bounded by Lemma 2 as,
tr[Ψ−1ZT Σ−1∆] ≤
r∑
i=1
σi (WΨΛ−1/2Ψ NΛ
−1/2
Σ
WTΣ)σi (∆).
The two singular values can then be bounded by Lemma 1. For the
first singular value,
σi (WΨΛ−1/2Ψ NΛ
−1/2
Σ
WTΣ) ≤
WΨΛ−1/2Ψ NΛ−1/2Σ WTΣF√
i
≤
Λ−1/2Σ F Λ−1/2Ψ F ∥N ∥F√
i
.
By definition,
Λ−1/2Σ F = √tr(Λ−1Σ ) = σ (Σ−1)1/21 , where ∥·∥1 is
the 1-norm. By norm relation,
σ (Σ−1)1/21 ≤ m1/4 σ (Σ−1)1/22 .
With similar derivation for
Λ−1/2
Ψ

F and with Theorem 2, the
singular value can be bounded with probability 1 − δ as,
σi (WΨΛ−
1
2
Ψ
NΛ−
1
2
Σ
WTΣ)
≤ (mn)
1
4 ζ (δ ) σ (Σ−1) 122 σ (Ψ−1) 122√
i
.
Meanwhile, the other singular value can be readily bounded with
Lemma 1 as σi (∆) ≤ s2(f )/
√
i . Hence, the latter part of the first
term is bounded with probability ≥ 1 − δ as,
tr[Ψ−1ZT Σ−1∆]
≤(mn) 14 ζ (δ )Hr s2(f )
σ (Σ−1) 122 σ (Ψ−1) 122 . (7)
Since the parameter (σ (Σ−1)2 σ (Ψ−1)2)1/2 appears a lot in the
derivation, let us define
ϕ = (σ (Σ−1)2 σ (Ψ−1)2)1/2.
Finally, combining Eq. (6) and (7) yields the bound for the first term,
tr[Ψ−1YT Σ−1∆] ≤ γHr s2(f )ϕ2 + (mn)1/4ζ (δ )Hr s2(f )ϕ .
The second term: tr[Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y]. By following the same steps
as in the first term, it can be shown that the second term has the
exact same bound as the first terms, i.e.
tr[Ψ−1∆T Σ−1Y] ≤ γHr s2(f )ϕ2 + (mn)1/4ζ (δ )Hr s2(f )ϕ .
The third term: tr[Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2)]. Applying Lemma 2 and
1, we can readily bound it as,
tr[Ψ−1 f (X2)T Σ−1 f (X2)] ≤ γ 2Hrϕ2.
The fourth term: −tr[Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)]. Since this term has
the negative sign, we consider the absolute value instead. Using
Lemma 3,tr[Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)] ≤ r∑
i=1
σi (Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)).
Then, using the singular value bound in Lemma 1,
σi (Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)) ≤
Ψ−1F ∥ f (X1)∥2F Σ−1F√
i
.
Hence, the fourth term can be bounded by,tr[Ψ−1 f (X1)T Σ−1 f (X1)] ≤ γ 2Hr,1/2ϕ2.
Four terms combined: by combining the four terms and rearrang-
ing them, the characteristic equation becomes,
αϕ2 + βϕ ≤ 2ϵ .
This is a quadratic equation, of which the solution is known to be
ϕ ∈ [−β−
√
β 2+8αϵ
2α ,
−β+√β 2+8αϵ
2α ]. Since we know ϕ > 0, we only
have the one-sided solution,
ϕ ≤ −β +
√
β2 + 8αϵ
2α ,
which implies the criterion in Theorem 3. □
B L2-SENSITIVITIES
Here, we derive the L2-sensitivity for the MVG mechanism used in
our experiments.
B.1 Experiment I
The query function is f (X) = X ∈ [0, 1]6×248. For neighboring
datasets {X,X′}, the L2-sensitivity is
s2(f ) = sup
X,X′
X − X′F = sup
X,X′
√√ 6∑
i=1
(x(i) − x ′(i))2 = √6.
B.2 Experiment II
The query function is f (X) = 1N XXT , where X ∈ [−1, 1]4×2021. For
neighboring datasets {X,X′}, the L2-sensitivity is
s2(f ) = sup
X,X′
xjxTj − x′jx′Tj F
2021 =
2
√∑42
j=1 x j (i)2
2021 =
8
2021 .
B.3 Experiment III
The query function is the same as Exp. I, so the L2-sensitivity can
be readily derived as s2(f ) = supX,X′
√∑21
i=1(x(i) − x ′(i))2 =
√
21.
